Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is

a great privilege to be here before the Committee on such a complicated

and important subject. I do not have a written statement,

but I do have a few preliminary remarks I would like to make.

Without going into the historic roots of Russian foreign policy, let

me make just a few introductory remarks about some of the forces

I think are motivating Russian foreign policy today.

I think there are two principal aspects to Russian foreign policy,

motivating them. Both of them are resulting from the conditions in

which Russia finds itself today. A deplorable economic state and

deteriorating scientific and defense establishment industry is one.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union is another, and finally, deep

humiliation about their fall from great power status to a middling

political power with an economy about the size of the State of Illinois.

The first state, their deplorable economic state affecting their

military and their defense industries, leads to arms sales, technology

sales, scientific missions and so on that are certainly affecting

us in a number of parts of the world.

My sense is that the primary motivation is economic rather than

political but, in some cases, I don’t think you can rule out a political

motive. They are desperate to keep their arms industries going.

They are desperate to keep their scientists employed, and in addi-

tion to that, the control of the state over all of its entities is fairly

loose.

The second part, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, has not

fully been accepted by a number of quarters inside Russia, and

there is a sense that somehow the former parts of the Soviet Union

eventually will in some way rejoin or something and that the vast

raw materials, for example, down in the Caucasus and in central

Asia really, by right, belong to Russia. I think that, in part, motivates

some very troublesome aspects of Russian policy in, for example,

Georgia, in Azerbaijan, and elsewhere in central Asia.

In addition to that is a third, the sense of humiliation of Russians,

of a proud country reduced from its Cold War status to its

present condition. I think that sense of humiliation is leading them

to lash out in many directions, is in itself beginning to breed an

anti-Western sense of nationalism, and I will mention that a little

later.

In the early post-Cold War years, I think the United States in

its policy was very cognizant of this sense of humiliation. We really

reached out to try to avoid saying that the Soviets lost the Cold

War, reached out to make them feel a member of the Western community.

That even went to the extent in 1993 of looking the other way

when a disagreement between Yeltsin and the parliament led to a

shelling of the parliament building when they refused to be dismissed.

In 1994, in the tragedy in Chechnya, the Administration

said, initially, that it is an internal matter—quite different from

what we have said subsequently about Kosovo, for example.

We really reached out to try to embrace the Russians, but I think

gradually we have changed. We have not changed our policy. What

we have changed is the execution of the policy. Gradually, we have

turned to a policy either of neglect of Russia or hectoring them on

issues that are of importance to the United States. I think it is further

humiliating them and is a primary cause now of the growth

of anti-Western and anti-U.S. nationalism in Russia.

I think this change, again in execution, not in policy, really

began with NATO expansion. NATO is, for the Russians, the living

symbol of their defeat and fall from power. Now, do the Russians

go to bed every night worrying about NATO, wake up every morning

cursing NATO? No, of course not, but NATO is still a four letter

word for the Russians and will always remain one.

With respect to NATO expansion, all of the prospective new

members of NATO, with the exception of Slovenia, are former

members of the Warsaw Pact or of the Soviet Union itself. I think

the Russians could be excused if they think that all this is happening

to them because they are weak and we are taking advantage

of that weakness, thus, again, reminding them how they have

changed and deepening their humiliation.

I think almost everything that has happened in the last years,

whether it is this, whether it is the ABM treaty, or proliferation,

has furthered this attitude. To me, the climax of this trend took

place in January this year when the Secretary of State went to

Moscow to meet with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

She said she had a five point agenda: First, the Russian budget

is unrealistic; second, the CFE proposals, that is, conventional force

changes, in Europe are unacceptable; third, we deeply resent the

anti-Semitic character of recent Russian remarks. Fourth, the

transfer of missile and nuclear technology to Iran is unacceptable,

and if it continues, we will cutoff quotas for Russian rocket

launches. This seems to me counterproductive and, again, could be

interpreted by Russians as an economic competition seeking to shut

down their rocket industry in favor of ours. Last, we have a problem

with the ABM treaty because of rogue nations with missiles,

and we would like to negotiate revisions. If we can’t do that, we

may have to denounce it.

The only thing the Russians have left of great power status is

their nuclear weapons; and the abrogation of the ABM treaty could

jeopardize their ability, especially in their weakened state, to maintain

a robust deterrence.

When Ms. Albright was asked the question, well, given this list,

the agenda you have, is it time to return to a policy of containment

of Russia? She said, don’t be ridiculous, our policy is engagement.

I think this is illustrates the problem we face. We are doing things

unconsciously to the Russians that are driving them into

hypernationalism.

It is not our intent, but we need to look at our policies to see if

there are not ways we can engage the Russians, on nonproliferation,

for example.

We just beat up on them in Iran. Have we asked them to help

us with North Korea, with Libya, with all of the others ‘‘rogue’’

states? No. Take the ABM treaty. Ronald Reagan said when we develop

SDI that we will give it to the Soviet Union. Why not go to

them and say, look, we both face this threat. Why not cooperate in

dealing with it?

I don’t think the Russians are in a position to do anything about

any of these things, they are so weak. It is the attitude and the

perception of us taking advantage of them in that condition which

troubles me.

The final chapter in this saga was the initiation of a bombing

campaign in Kosovo when Primakov was literally in the air flying

to Washington, the ultimate humiliation. Either he came to Washington

as if nothing had happened or had to turn around and go

home. While I agree with Congressman Leach’s comments about

Russia and Serbia, I think a lot of their motivation right now is

not a Serbian-Russian love affair so much as it is the Russians

want to be a participant. They want to be included. They don’t

want to be ignored except when we beat up on them.

Ironically, we are now turning to them, imploring them to bail

NATO out of a failed or a faltering military policy. This is an enormous

temptation for the Russians, both to deal NATO a blow and

to appear now as a key peace maker, the person or the country

that will solve the problems we face in Kosovo.

So I think, basically, while the Russians are doing a number of

things that we don’t like and we certainly ought to call them to account

for it, we are in danger of promoting, by our actions, not by

our policy, a virulent anti-West, anti-U.S. nationalism which we

will come to regret in coming years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think that we need to keep

in mind the benefits of the kind of policy we had in the Cold War.

A rule of thumb for me would be to have better relations with both

the Russians and the Chinese than they can ever have with each

other. They may be tactical allies now, and I believe the Russians

are doing things against their fundamental interests—selling weapons

and technology to the Chinese.

I doubt the possibilities of a thorough strategic alliance between

the two. There are too many enmities, but they are two big players

in the world. They are two of our primary concerns in this new millennium,

and we need to get it straight with both of them and act

with respect to both of them from cold, calculated policy, not emotion.

I think the jury is still out. The Russians

are searching for their soul in many respects. I think the historic

arguments between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers in Russia

is, in a way, still going on in modernized form. Who are they, the

Russians are asking themselves, who are they, what are their fundamental

interests, and so on.

Historically, Russia has been invaded over and over and over,

and their fundamental security policy has been to build padding

around the Russian heartland to give defensive space, and it has

served them well.

One of the whole problems of Eastern Europe and what we do

about Eastern Europe goes back to that. For the West, it has been

a buffer against the infection of communist Russia. For the Russians

it has been a bulwark that invaders would have to penetrate.

I think we ought to do two things: First of all, shore up, to the

extent we can, the independence and the ability to survive of the

former members of the Soviet Union, encourage them to have viable

political systems and economic systems and let the Russians

know that we consider them permanently independent. But, do it

in such a way as not to drive Russia into a belief that we are trying

to take advantage of their period of weakness to build a system

around them by which we can throttle them or keep them under

control.

It is a fine line. I don’t think it is past our

ability to do. If we don’t do it we are going to fall off one way or

another, and I think we will live to regret it.

Mr. Gejdenson, that is quite a list, but let

me say something quickly on each one.

On the launch quota as leverage, it just seems to me that it is

counterproductive leverage. What we are saying is we are going to

punish your good, honest firms who are doing things right in order

to get at the ones who aren’t.

It seems to me that instead of doing that, we ought to say we

will increase the quotas for these firms to show that we are cognizant

of the good and the bad actors.

Now, what we can substitute for it, I don’t know. I have looked

around. It is not easy, but I don’t think you can defend the policy

we have on the basis that we have to do something.

I will be happy to because we have forgotten

U.S. interests here. We need places to launch our satellites. We

do not have the capability here, and we are going to fall way behind

unless we can solve this problem somehow.

On the ABM treaty, it is a very complicated problem. I really do

think we ought to try to enlist the Russians cooperatively. I think

Michael makes a very good point, they are pretty hopeless now.

They probably can’t do anything even if they tried, but the psychological

impact of our making the effort would be good.

We also need to think, in the whole missile business, about the

Chinese and their attitude toward missile defenses and so on.

There is no point in doing something which will create the problems

we are trying to avoid.

On arms sales, I don’t disagree with you, but I think we are

thoughtful about our arms sales. It doesn’t always work out, but

the Russians are really not being thoughtful. They will sell to anybody

who has the money to pay for it, and unfortunately, that is

mostly the rogue states.

NATO, I think, is still of critical importance to the United States;

and it is less what NATO does than the fact of NATO. It represents

American participation in the security of Europe; and if we have

learned anything in this century, it is that that is critical. We can-

not have a decent relationship, security relationship with Europe

unless we have that kind of umbrella of NATO.

I wouldn’t disagree with that. I think the

real danger here is, aside from these four groups, that there will

arise because of a heightened spirit of nationalism, resentment at

the West and so on, a leader who promises order, who promises he

is going to lead Russia back to a time of greatness; and it is in circumstances

like that that they may reach out to Belarussia.

Short of that, I don’t think it will happen, and I don’t see that

on the horizon; but if you look at the crop of Presidential candidates

for the year 2000, it doesn’t inspire confidence.

I think we are going to have to be patient

about the Russian political system. They don’t know where they

are. They don’t know what they want. All these groups are contending

back and forth.

There are also the sophisticated urban areas of Moscow, St. Petersburg,

then the rest of the country, which increasingly looks on

Moscow as a hostile state.

All these things may take decades to work themselves out; and

what we need to do is be patient, be firm, patient but helpful where

we can. Economically I agree we can’t help at all right now, but

we ought not to do things that gratuitously give rise to a kind of

a hostile sentiment in the Russians and lead the Russians to say

we don’t belong to the West, we can’t get into NATO, we can’t get

into the EU, the West doesn’t consider us as Western; therefore, we

had better not be, we had better do something else. That is the

danger.

We ought to push them wherever we can.

Are they going to make a big difference in the short run? Absolutely

not. But I think they certainly do no harm, and they advance

our understanding of them and their’s of us.

No, I don’t think so. I think in this sense

Europe is unique. It has been the cockpit of wars for 100 years. We

have now, I hope, overcome that. If we ever have a really huge crisis

again, a world crisis, the people who are going to stand by us

in dealing with it are going to be the Europeans. It is not going

to be India, it is not going to be China, it is not going to be Japan

and so on, wonderful countries though they are.

The core of the kinds of things that we believe in and the core

of the kind of world that we are promoting reside in the Atlantic

community; and we need that kind of solidity.

I am much less concerned about NATO as an instrument to do

anything, as I am about continuing to develop the sense between

Europe and the United States that we are one, that we work together,

that we think because that is what is going to make a better

world for all of us.

No, I think you missed my point. My point

is not that we agree on everything with the Europeans. My point

is that we come from the same root principles; and therefore, we

are natural allies. We differ on a number of things. The French

never left the NATO alliance. They left the Integrated Command

System. When the chips are down, the French are there. Anytime

there is a little wiggle room, they will wiggle away.

What I am really saying is that we should not let this group that

did so wonderfully in World War II and in the Cold War dissipate

and have the United States go back to isolationism and Europe go

its own way.

I am not sure European integration is at the point where it will

make it without the kind of stability that the Atlantic alliance

gives it.

Yes, I think SDI is in our long-term interests,

but I underscore long term. I think we ought to proceed with

a vigorous ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘D’’ program. I don’t think we have the answer

to a system that is deployable at anything like the cost and effectiveness

that we really ought to have, but I think we ought to work

on it, and I see no reason we shouldn’t go to the Russians and say

we would like their cooperation. We would develop a system cooperatively

and then would provide it to any country that is worried

about a missile attack on its territory. I would transform the program

from a unilateral, in-your-face one, which we have now, to

something which can be a defensive weapon for everybody.

Yes, that is correct, we could. You see, I

think the Russians would be amenable to modifications, assuming

they are part of it—but weapons in space are something else. They

won’t agree to anything where they can’t keep up and which we

could use to deny them a deterrent capability.

I think NATO is very much at stake in

Kosovo, depending on how it comes out. NATO will not disintegrate

regardless of what happens, but it could erode and cease to be a

cohesive force.

However we got to Rambouillet, we did it with the accompaniment

of a lot of threats to Milosevic, threats by the Secretary of

State, Secretary of Defense, SACEUR and so on. When a great

power threatens, it has to be prepared to carry out that threat. We

have not always done that in the past, but that is a cardinal rule,

because if you don’t carry it out, then people cease paying attention

to your threats and then you do have to use force.

We operated from that point on with fairly fuzzy objectives. The

Rambouillet objectives were different from those cited as the objectives

of the bombing. They were not the same kinds of objectives,

although they should have been identical, and our strategy was

based on hope, rather than cold, calculating analysis. Once you say

you are going to use force, you need to have it sufficient to achieve

your objective.

I don’t think the bombing is punishment. I think it is hope—hope

that we won’t have to get troops on the ground and we don’t have

to get into a dirty ground war, that somehow this immaculate coercion

will change Milosevic’s mind.

I don’t think there ever has been a case—I can’t think of a case

where a bombing campaign by itself has changed a foreign leader’s

mind. The Serbs, if they stand for anything, it is their pride and

their ability to take pain and show how tough they are.

So it seems to me that the part of the Powell Doctrine—and I

don’t like that term. I think it is a misnomer—which is essential

is the need to achieve your objectives. You can try it with bombing,

but if bombing doesn’t work in the first 3 days, don’t keep it up

for 6 more months hoping it will.

You have to have something else in your kit bag to say, yes, we

are going to achieve that objective. If this doesn’t do it, then we

will do something, and that is what I think was not done.

I think it is exactly right.

Just very briefly, I am pessimistic about

the ability of negotiations to achieve our objectives—maybe to give

us a fig leaf but not to achieve our objectives. I think the only way

we can achieve our objectives is to prepare for and, if necessary,

use ground forces.